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PART A: INTRQDUCTION AND SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  During  their  May  1992  meeting,  the  Committee  of  Governors  approved  a  report 
submitted by the Ad-Hoc Working Group on EC Payment systems on "Issues of common concern to 
EC Central banks in the field of payment systems" (the Main Report). This report set up four lines of 
action for the Working Group on EC Payment Systems, which was created as a follow-up to the Main 
Report. The present document deals with Line of Action 2 of the Main Report:  "The establishment 
and implementation of minimum common features for domestic systems I. 
2.  As  explained in the  Main  Report,  in the  Single  Market,  banks  have  acquired  more 
flexibility to organise cross-border payment arrangements and to participate in funds transfer systems 
based in other EC  countries.  In this  context,  EC  central banks  need to co-operate to ensure  that 
differences between domestic payment systems do not create risks for the integrity and stability of 
domestic and cross-border payment arrangements. They also need to ensure that these differences do 
not  distort competitive conditions or create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. 
3.  On the road to Stage III of EMU, the issues of efficiency, risk and fair competition will 
become increasingly important. A common approach to these problems by EC  central banks  will 
assist the establishment of more unified payment arrangements which will be necessary in order to 
provide EC economies with the full benefits of monetary union. 
4.  This document concludes with 10 principles, covering the six areas which were identified 
in the  Main  Report  as  requiring  specification  in terms  of minimum  common  features:  access 
conditions, risk management policies, legal issues, standards and infrastructures, pricing policies and 
business hours. 
5.  These principles  will  serve  as  guidelines  to each EC  central bank in relation to the 
evolution of  the payment system in its country. In this regard, EC central banks consider that it is part 
of their oversight function to make their best efforts to implement these principles and to convince 
private operators or public authorities that they need to address the issues raised in this report. 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
Scope of the study 
6.  The implementation of the second line of action of the Main Report primarily concerns 
the harmonisation of some of the main features of the large-value interbank funds transfer systems 
(IFI'S) which are the core elements of payment systems in modem economies. Securities settlement 
The text of Action 2 is in Annex 1 of this report. 2 
systems  which entail very  specific issues  are  not  covered in this report.  As  to retail  systems, EC 
central banks feel that, because the level of risks involved is lower, they  may not have to follow all 
the rules which need to be defined for large-value systems. Finally, EC central banks consider that the 
need for common rules is more important for direct access to interbank funds transfer systems, while 
local rules may prevail for indirect access, where less systemic risk is involved. 
Access conditions to IFTS 
7.  It  is assumed in this report that, in the EC, settlement services to IFfS, as well as netting 
services which involve credit risk for the netting provider, are always performed by central banks or 
credit institutions, either directly or through organisations which they fully own. Therefore, the report 
focuses on access conditions to IFfS in general and, in particular, on the status of direct participation. 
8.  There are two main reasons for harmonising access conditions in the EC. First, access is 
an important element of risk control and, second, fair access is an important requirement of  the Single 
Market.  To achieve these two objectives, EC  central banks  are  convinced that the  status  of direct 
participation  in IFfS  should  be  restricted  to  institutions  which  are  appropriately  regulated  and 
supervised  (i.e.  credit  institutions),  with  only  a  few,  well  delimited  exceptions  (Principle  1). 
Consequently, EC central banks are of the opinion that funds  transfer systems in which non-banks2 
(other than those mentioned in Principle  1)  are direct participants should not be allowed to process 
third-party  payments.  Moreover,  should  a  credit  institution  wish  to  participate  in,  or  become 
settlement  agent  of,  a  funds  transfer  system  in which  non-banks  (other than those  mentioned  in 
Principle 1) participate, it should assess the risks involved and inform its respective central bank and 
supervisory authority. 
9.  In keeping with the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive, remote access should be 
allowed,  provided  that  the  applicant  follows  the  "host  country"  rules  (Principle  2);  although  the 
implementation of this  principle may  be  difficult because  of the  practical problems  involved,  EC 
central banks are of the view that the latter can often be dealt with in a pragmatic manner. 
10.  Access criteria need to be laid down so that the right to participate in large-value IFfS is 
conferred  only  on those  entities  which  are  best  able  to  bear  the  risks  involved.  To  facilitate 
competition within the context of the Single Market, these criteria need to be transparent and should 
follow some guidelines (Principle 3). The stringency involved in access criteria should be related to 
the level of protection of the IFfS vis-a-vis systemic risks, although participants in an IFfS in which 
significant risks remain should not avoid or delay improvements to the safety features of  the system in 
order to keep any competitive advantage resulting from stricter access conditions. 
2  In this report, "bank" is used for "credit institutions" as defined in the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive. 3 
Risk management policies 
11.  Since a major objective of central banks is to minimise, and as far as possible eliminate, 
systemic risks associated with payment systems, EC central banks consider that a more extensive use 
of real-time gross-settlement (RTGS) systems which settle at the central bank is desirable in the near 
future in the processing of  large-value payments. Such systems minimise settlement risks leaving only 
residual sources of risks  (e.g.  technical risks or credit and liquidity risks caused by anticipation of 
payments queued within the system). EC central banks recommend that, in the next few  years,  an 
RTGS  system should be established in all EC  countries in order to reduce  systemic risks  and to 
facilitate  delivery-versus-payment  arrangements.  This  would  also  provide  a  sound  basis  for  the 
creation of direct links between EC IFI'S in Stage ill of EMU (Principle 4). EC  central banks also 
believe that large-value net-settlement systems which may continue to operate in parallel with RTGS 
systems should meet, as soon as possible, certain criteria, in particular those which are set out in the 
Lamfalussy Report (Principle 5).  As  far  as  other systems  are  concerned, for  example IFI'S which 
process  low-value  non-urgent  payments,  the  deflnition  of the  risk  reduction  policies  is  left  to 
individual EC central banks which will, however, have to keep other EC central banks informed of 
their actions (Principle 6). 
Legal issues 
12.  It is  important  that  the  risk  reduction  measures  which  central  banks  endeavour  to 
implement as payment systems overseers are not threatened by inadequate domestic legal provisions. 
Moreover, in the EC  context, there is  a need to avoid inconsistencies between the domestic legal 
systems which could increase payment systems risks. A Working Group has been set up by the EC 
Commission in this respect, with which the WGPS is collaborating closely. A report is expected by 
the end of this year. EC  central banks will take this report into consideration and submit their own 
conclusions to the Committee of Governors (or to the EMI  Council, if appropriate).  However, EC 
central banks have already identified that the "zero-hour rule", which exists in some countries, has the 
potential to create systemic disruption (Principle 7). 
Technical issues 
13.  No payment system could work without a minimum set of common standards and some 
common  infrastructures.  At  the  EC  level,  central  banks  are  following  with  interest  the  work 
undertaken by the private banks  within the European Committee for  Banking Standards; they  are 
aware of efforts being made by banking communities to improve the infrastructures used to process 
low-value cross-border payments;  and they  are  themselves undertaking  work on possible linkages 
between large-value RTGS systems (Principle 8). 
Central banks' pricing policies for payment services 
14.  Payment services  provided by EC  central banks  are  priced  according  to  a variety  of 
principles. In many instances, EC central banks do not fully recover their costs. This situation is not 
satisfactory because, in the context of the Single Market, it may be an obstacle to the establishment of 4 
a "level playing field" between market participants. Although there may still be exceptions to this rule 
in order to encourage some means of payments or some transfer systems, EC  central banks' pricing 
policies will aim at eliminating any competitive distortion within the Single Market. This policy will 
also represent the groundwork for Stage III of EMU, in which participating EC central banks will be 
offering payment services in the same currency (Principle 9). 
Operating hours 
15.  A greater overlap of the main EC IFI'S operating hours would be desirable to facilitate 
cross-border  payments.  Applied  to  RTGS  systems,  such  extension  would  also  strengthen  the 
soundness  of delivery-versus-payment mechanisms.  Progress in this field  during  Stage II  of EMU 
would also smooth the transition to Stage III in which greater (and possibly full) harmonisation will 
be needed (Principle 10). 
Follow-up 
16.  Progress made in implementing the ten principles below will be evaluated once a year by 
EC central banks in an annual report to the Governors. 
LIST OF PRINCIPLES 
Principle 1: Direct access to interbank funds transfer systems 
As a rule, only central banks and credit institutions, as defined under the Second 
Banking  Co-ordination  Directive,  can  be  admitted as  direct participants  in  funds  transfer 
systems which process third-party payments. As exceptions, certain other bodies authorised to 
hold  accounts  for  customers  may  also  be,  with  the  approval  of  the  central  bank,  direct 
participants in such systems provided that (a) their public nature ensures little risk of failure or 
(b) they are supervised by a recognised competent authority. 
Principle 2: No discrimination in access 
No  discrimination can be made between home-based credit institutions and credit 
institutions licensed in  other EC countries which  ask  to  participate in local  interbank funds 
transfer systems, either through their local  branches or directly from  another Member State 
(remote access). The applicants, however, may be required to establish that they can meet the 
relevant legal  provisions  of the host country. They  also  have  to  comply  with  the necessary 
technical  requirements  of  the  system;  these  requirements,  however,  should  not  be 
discriminatory. 
Principle 3: Transparency of access criteria 
Access criteria to interbank funds transfer systems should be laid down in a public 
document. This document should also set out procedures for removing a participant from the 
system. Additional criteria beyond those embodied in Principles 1 and 2 may apply to  direct 
participants. These criteria may include one or more of the following conditions: 5 
a.  adequate financial strength of the institution; 
b.  minimum number of transactions; 
c.  the payment of an entry fee; 
d.  the approval (on  technical or creditworthiness grounds) of either the owner/manager of 
the system or the direct participants; 
e.  the approval  of the local  central  bank  (when  possible within  the legal  context of the 
country). 
Principle 4; Real-time gross-settlement systems 
As soon  as feasible, every member state should have a real-time gross-settlement 
system into which as many large-value payments as possible should be channelled. Such systems 
should settle across accounts at the central bank and have sound legal, technical and prudential 
features, which are compatible across EC Member States. 
Principle 5; Large-value net-settlement systems 
Provided they settle at the central bank, large-value net-settlement systems  may 
continue to operate in parallel to real-time gross-settlement systems but, in the near future, they 
should (a) settle on the same-day as the exchange of the payment instruments; and (b) meet the 
Lamfalussy standards in full. 
Principle 6; Other interbank funds transfer systems 
As a part of their oversight function, EC central banks will assess the scale and the 
nature of the settlement risk in all interbank funds transfer systems operating in their country. 
While seeking to  reduce as far as  possible the risks in  these systems, EC central banks may 
adopt, for systems not covered by Principles 4 and 5, a somewhat flexible approach which takes 
into account the costs and benefits of any envisaged solution. Over time, whenever systems are 
changed or redesigned, increasingly high standards of risk-reduction should be achieved. 
Principle 7; Legal issues 
The legal  basis  of domestic  payment systems  should  be sound and enforceable. 
Inconsistencies  between  domestic  legal  systems  in  the  EC which  increase  risks  in  payment 
systems need to  be analysed and, as far as possible, reduced. As a first step, where necessary, 
EC central banks will  press for changes to  certain aspects of national bankruptcy laws  (e.g. 
"zero-hour clause"). 
Principle 8; Technical issues 
Compatible banking standards and efficient channels of communication  between 
EC payment systems are desirable and will assist the processing of cross-border payments in the 
context of the Single Market. They will  become increasingly important in view  of EMU. EC 6 
central banks will support and participate in the efforts made by banking communities in these 
fields. 
Principle 9: Pricing policies of EC central banks 
The pricing policies of EC central banks, in respect of payment systems functions, 
will aim at the avoidance of any competitive distortion within the context of the Single Market 
and in preparation for EMU. As a general objective, such policies will aim at the full recovery 
by the central banks of the costs of these services. 
Principle 10: Operating hours 
The overlap between operating hours of the major EC interbank funds  transfer 
systems (and in particular the hours of RTGS systems) is  necessary and could be increased in 
order to facilitate  cross-border payments  and delivery-versus-payment mechanisms.  In  this 
respect, and as  a preparatory step towards EMU,  EC central banks will  consider closer co-
ordination of the operating hours of their settlement services. 7 
PART B: ANALYSIS OF POLICY OBJECTIVES 
CHAPTER 1: THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
1.  In order to clarify the analysis and the principles which are contained in this report, this 
chapter distinguishes: 
payment systems from funds transfer systems and securities settlement systems; 
interbank funds transfer systems (IFfS) from other kinds of  funds transfer systems; 
large-value payments from retail payments and; 
direct participants from indirect participants and customers. 
1.1 Payment systems. funds transfer systems and securities settlement systems 
Payment systems 
2.  The Report "Payment Systems in EC Member States" (the Blue Book), published by the 
Committee of Governors in September 1992, defines a payment system as  "a group of institutions, 
and a set of procedures, which is used to ensure the circulation of money within a geographical area, 
generally  a country".  Although  central  banks  are  entrusted  with the  task of overseeing  payment 
systems  in general,  their  attention  mostly  focuses  on the  functioning  of funds  transfer  systems 
(especially large-value ones)  which are the key  elements of payment systems  and the mechanisms 
which are more likely to create systemic risks.  Therefore,  in the European context, central banks' 
attention is primarily drawn to the harmonisation of  the main features of  funds transfer systems (FfS). 
Funds transfer systems 
3.  According  to  the  Blue  Book,  a  funds  transfer  system  may  be  defined  as  "a formal 
arrangement, based on private contract or statute law, with multiple membership, common rules and 
standardised  arrangements,  for  the  transmission  and  the  settlement  of money  obligations  arising 
between the members". In contrast with, for example, unilateral arrangements (where funds are moved 
within  a single  bank)  or bilateral  arrangements  (such  as  correspondent banking),  there  are  three 
relevant characteristics of funds transfer systems: 
they have more than two direct participants; 
they have a common set of  rules (particularly about settlement arrangements), and; 
each direct participant deals either with a commonly agreed central body, such as  a clearing 
house, or with each and all of  the other direct participants. 
Securities settlement systems 
4.  All EC countries have at least one example of a FrS which processes the cash leg of 
securities transactions, in general under some form of delivery-versus-payment mechanism. According 8 
to the Parkinson Report3,  "central banks are concerned about the strength of securities clearance and 
settlement  arrangements  because  they  perceive  that  disturbances  to  settlements  in the  securities 
markets have the potential to spread to the payment system and to the financial  system generally". 
Although it is perhaps difficult, in principle, to justify the exclusion of such systems from the scope of 
this  study,  the  specific  nature  of securities  settlement  systems  requires  specific  access  and  risk-
management  criteria.  Therefore  this  report  will  not  discuss  issues  relating  to  these  systems.  It 
recommends instead that further work should be undertaken in this field, drawing on the conclusions 
of  this report and on the work already carried out by the G  10 countries in this field. 
1.2 Interbank funds transfer systems (IFTS) and other funds transfer systems 
5.  In  modem economies,  funds  transfer  systems  are  used  primarily  to process  cashless 
payments which involve the transfer of deposit money from one bank account to another. Therefore, 
banks have been, so far, in all EC countries, the major participants (and sometimes the exclusive ones) 
in funds transfer systems. In the rest of  the report interbank funds transfer systems (IFfS) refer to FfS 
in which most (or all) of  the participants are credit institutions. 
6.  In addition, interbank settlements are  often made in central bank money,  as  this is the 
only way of achieving ultimate settlement. As a result, to a large extent, funds transfer systems have 
been, up to now, IFfS which settle at the central bank. These systems are at the core of the present 
report since central banks have several reasons  for  being interested in their proper functioning:  as 
operators  (at  least  as  settlement  agents);  as  payment  systems  overseers  because  of the  systemic 
implications that their inappropriate functioning would have; and, in some countries, as supervisors of 
the participants. 
7.  However, central banks cannot disregard IFfS which do not settle at the central bank, 
and other kinds of FfS in general, for the following two reasons: first, because the difficulties which 
can arise in any  system in which banks participate, and in any  system in which direct participants 
process third-party (customer) payments, may create systemic problems similar to those which stem 
from IFfS which settle at the central bank; second, because central banks are  anxious that the risk-
reduction measures which they require IFfS to undertake should not be circumvented by customers 
moving their payment flows to less-protected systems. Therefore all IFfS are covered by the study, 
whether or not they settle at the central bank, as well as any kind of FfS in which direct participants 
process third-party (customer) payments. 
8.  Netting schemes run by non-banks are not covered by the report, provided that they do 
not process third-party payments. Nevertheless, since the widespread use of such schemes could raise 
public policy issues, EC central banks believe that they should attempt to keep themselves informed 
about developments in this field which might threaten the stability of the payment system as a whole, 
3  The report "Delivery versus payment in Securities Settlement Systems" prepared by the Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries. 9 
diminish the role of banks in the economy, reduce central banks' awareness of the organisation of the 
payment flows, and therefore restrain their ability to act as overseers. 
1.3 Laree-yalue payments ys. retail payments 
9.  Although, as  explained in the Main Report, central banks cannot disregard any type of 
payments, they are particularly concerned with certain categories which (1) have an urgent nature (for 
example because incoming funds are used for outgoing payments on the same day); and/or (2) which 
need to be irrevocable in order to ensure final settlement. The four types of payments below relate to 
one or both of  these two categories: 
incoming and outgoing payments stemming from the central bank operations in the interbank 
money market; 
more generally, payments linked to the functioning of the financial  markets in which trading 
involves the use of same-day funds several times a day (and therefore, in some systems where 
funds may be "re-used" several times before they are finally settled, e.g. the domestic currency 
side of foreign exchange transactions, eurocurrency markets, interbank lending operations, etc.); 
high-value, or urgent payments made by non-bank customers, mostly corporate, and; 
payments representing settlement operations for netting schemes or "delivery-versus-payment 
mechanisms",  for  which  the  irrevocability  and  fmality  of  settlement  transactions  is  a 
prerequisite for risk control. 
10.  Because most of  these payments have a relatively high value, they are often called "large-
value  payments"  although  it  is  their  urgency  and  their  need  for  irrevocability,  as  well  as  their 
magnitude,  which creates their specific importance in the  smooth functioning  of payment systems. 
This report will follow this terminology. In addition, it will refer to: 
"retail payments" for payments which do not fit into the four types referred to above; 
"large-value FfS" for systems which process, exclusively or not, at least one of the four types 
of payments detailed above, and; 
"retail systems" for FfS in which only retail payments are processed. 
1.4 Direct participants. indirect participants and customers 
11.  There is no single way to process payments through a FfS. Following the situation most 
commonly used in EC  countries,  three layers  of participants  in FfS may  be  distinguished:  direct 
participants, indirect participants and customers. The key distinction between direct participants, on 
the  one  hand,  and  indirect  participants  or  customers,  on  the  other  hand,  is  responsibility  for 
settlement only direct participants are responsible to the settlement institution (or to all  other direct 
participants)  for  the settlement of their own payments, those  of their customers,  and those of the 
indirect participants on whose behalf they are  settling.  Indirect participants  are responsible only to 10 
their direct participant for settling all payments input to the system; they are not responsible to the 
other participants in the system or to the settlement agent in this respect. 
Table 1: Classification of direct participants. indirect participants and customers 
Identified  Exchange of  Responsibility  Responsibility for  Shares  Power of 
by the  payment  for  fulfilment of  expenses?  decision? 
IFfS?  instruments?  intra-system  standards and 
settlement?  laws? 
Direct  YES  YES  YES  YES for its own  YES  YES or NO 
operations 
Participants 
Indirect  YES or NO  YES or NO  NO  YESorNO  YES or  YES or NO 
NO 
Customers  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
12.  No FfS could work without direct participants. Indirect participation, on the contrary, is 
a form of membership which exists in varying degrees in FfS; it gives to institutions some functions 
and responsibilities of direct participation without going as far as entrusting them with the settlement 
responsibilities reserved to direct participants (see Table 1). Although the borderline between indirect 
participants and customers is usually clear in any given FfS, a general distinction is more difficult to 
draw because the functions and the responsibilities of indirect participants vary according to each FfS 
rules. In this report, an indirect participant is defined as an institution which fulfils at least one of the 
two following conditions: 
being identified by the  system (e.g.  by  a national  bank identification code  or by a SWIFf 
address) and permitted to send payment orders directly to the system or; 
being bound directly by the rules governing the functioning  of the system, or being granted 
certain privileges by the system. 11 
CHAPTER 2; ACCESS CONPITIONS TO IFTS 
2.1 The elements of a funds transfer system 
13.  Market  deregulation  and  developments  in information technology  have permitted the 
"unbundling" of  the functioning of a funds transfer system into four major elements: 
provision and receipt of payment orders; 
communication of payment information; 
netting operations (for net-settlement systems only), and; 
settlement operations. 
14.  As  a result, a wider range of service providers has appeared, not all of whom are credit 
institutions.  EC  central banks  are  concerned that each of these  functions  should be  performed by 
institutions which are subject to adequate prudential rules, as specified below. 
Provision and receipt of  payment orcters 
15.  This  function  is  called  "participation"  in the  rest  of the  report.  Sections  2.2  to  2.4 
hereafter focus on access conditions to this function. 
Communication of  payment information 
16.  EC central banks are  of the opinion that the communications function,  which involves 
technical risks,  needs  to be  performed by  institutions  whose  technical reliability is  of the highest 
standard.  As  overseers  of  payment  systems,  central  banks  need  to  satisfy  themselves  that 
communications providers, whether or not they are of a banking nature, are managing adequately their 
technical risks to avoid technical disruption to the functioning of transfer systems which could have 
systemic consequences. 
Netting QPerations 
17.  Netting  operations  in FfS  should  be  carried  out  by  a  central  bank  or  a  banking 
organisation4 if the netting agent bears any kind of financial responsibility. This will depend on the 
nature of netting: for example, a netting provider whose role is limited to calculation, can be a non-
bank organisation;  a  clearing· house  which  is  the  intermediary  between  participants  should  be  a 
banking organisation. 
Settlement QPerations 
18.  The settlement function which, by definition, implies financial risks for the participants, 
must always be carried out by a central bank or a credit institution. 
4  In this report,  banking  organisation means either a credit institution or an  organisation collectively owned  by 
credit institutions. 12 
19.  It is assumed in this report that the principles  concerning communication, netting and 
settlement are met and from here onwards, the report focuses on participation. 
2.2 Banks and non-banks 
20.  Principle 1: Direct access to interbank funds transfer systems 
As  a rule, only central banks and credit institutions, as  defined under the Second 
Banking  Co-ordination  Directive,  can  be  admitted  as  direct participants  in  funds  transfer 
systems which process third-party payments. As exceptions, certain other bodies authorised to 
hold  accounts  for  customers  may  also  be,  with  the  approval  of  the  central  bank,  direct 
participants in such systems provided that (a) their public nature ensures little risk of failure or 
(b) they are supervised by a recognised competent authority. 
21.  No  FTS  is  without  risks  (see  para.  46  to  49).  To  minimise  such risks,  appropriate 
standards need to be set for the financial strength, the management skills and the risks taken by direct 
participants. Moreover, compliance with such standards needs to be regularly supervised. In practice 
these  conditions  are  only  met  by  credit  institutions  for  which  supervision  regimes  have  been 
established. 
22.  Another argument in favour of credit institutions lies in their ability to raise liquidity 
within a very  short period of time  - a  key  factor  in facilitating  the  funding  of unexpected debit 
positions in FTS which process third-party payments - either through the interbank money market (to 
which non-banks  are  often excluded  in order to limit the risks  involved),  or through end-of-day 
standby facilities offered by central banks which, as a rule, are only available to credit institutions. 
23.  It is assumed that all EC credit institutions meet these conditions and it is the task of the 
host central bank to ensure that any  direct participant incorporated in a country outside the EC  is 
adequately  supervised.  Non-banks,  however,  typically  do  not  meet  such  standards,  nor  do 
arrangements exist to enable them to do  so.  Therefore,  any  institution wishing to become a direct 
participant in a FTS which processes third-party payments would need to have a banking licence. 
Exce_ptions 
24.  As  exceptions to the general principle, subject to the agreement of the overseer, two 
categories of non-banks may apply for participation in IFTS, in recognition of the present situation in 
many countries and of  the limited risks added to the systems by these institutions: 
public bodies, which are allowed to hold accounts for customers (e.g. post offices), and; 
some regulated financial institutions. (e.g. certain intermediaries in the securities markets). 
25.  In both cases, the authorisation could be either general, for any category of payments and 
any  system,  or subject to restrictions  (e.g.  only  the  settlement  of the  cash legs  of the  securities 
transactions).  In  any  case,  non-banks  are  not  covered  by  the provisions  of the  Second  Banking 
Co-ordination Directive and cannot use a domestic authorisation to gain access to FTS established in 
other EC countries. 13 
26.  In the light of  principle 1, every EC central bank will review the list of participants in all 
IFfS under its oversight. 
FfS run by non-banks 
27.  According to Principle 1, FfS run by non-banks should not be allowed to process third-
party (customer) payments. Therefore, in the rest of the report, reference will no longer be made to 
FfS (funds transfer systems) but to IFfS (interbank funds transfer systems). 
28.  It is  important to limit the extent to which interbank systems  can be  contaminated by 
settlement  problems  which  might  occur  in  systems  run  by  non-banks.  Therefore,  before  they 
participate in (or before they become settlement agents for) funds transfer systems in which non-banks 
participate, or systems which may not be under the control of EC  central banks, credit institutions 
should assess the risks involved. If they still wish to proceed, they should inform, and seek the views 
of, their respective central bank and supervisory authority. 
Accounts at the central bank 
29.  Some EC central banks maintain accounts for non-bank customers. In a real-time gross-
settlement system, the distinction between direct participants and customers may become blurred. EC 
central banks agree that, as far as possible, the scope given to non-banks, other than those referred to 
in Principle 1,  to open an  account at the central bank should not extend to direct access to gross-
settlement systems run by the central bank. Payments to and from these entities should be considered 
as  customer payments and presented as  such by the central bank.  Central  banks  will  be careful to 
avoid unfair competition with the private banking sector and, of course, they will make sure that the 
facilities offered to some non-banks to have access to gross-settlement systems are not used to process 
third-party payments. 
Indirect participants 
30.  As far as indirect participation is concerned, EC central banks concluded that it would be 
difficult, and probably unnecessary, to harmonise access criteria. Indeed, as explained in para.  11  and 
12, indirect participants have different functions and responsibilities in each system. Consequently, it 
would  be  very  difficult to  harmonise  access  conditions  for  indirect participants  without trying  to 
harmonise the status of indirect participants, a matter which would necessitate the modification of the 
functioning rules of many IFfS. Such a degree of harmonisation is not necessary, at least from the 
risk point of  view since, as explained in para. 11, indirect participants create limited financial risks for 
the systems. In this respect, subsidiarity is important and it is left to each IFfS, under the control of 
the  local  central bank,  to  decide  whether  or not only  banks  should be indirect participants.  It is 
assumed, however, that if non-banks  (other than those mentioned in principle  1) have  access to an 
IFfS through indirect participant status, they should not be allowed to process third-party payments. 14 
2.3 The Sin2le Market context 
31.  Principle 2: No discrimination in access 
No discrimination can be made between home-based credit institutions and credit 
institutions licensed in other EC countries which  ask to  participate in local  interbank funds 
transfer systems, either through their local  branches or directly from another Member State 
(remote access). The applicants, however, may be required to establish that they can meet the 
relevant legal  provisions of the host country. They  also  have to  comply  with  the necessary 
technical  requirements  of  the  system;  these  requirements,  however,  should  not  be 
discriminatory. 
32.  Traditionally, banks authorised in an EC country have been able to gain access to IFfS 
located in other countries either indirectly through a correspondent institution, or directly through a 
local branch. In the latter case, the local branch, under the supervision of the local authorities, could 
usually become a participant in the local IFfS under the same conditions as  other banks licensed in 
the country. 
33.  The  Second  Banking  Co-ordination  Directive  (2BCD)  allows  any  credit  institution 
authorised in any EC  country to open branches anywhere in the EC  without having to seek further 
authorisation from the relevant authorities in host Member States; supervision of  the local branches by 
the host authorities is of a residual or limited nature. Moreover, the 2BCD also allows any EC credit 
institution  to  provide  services,  including  "money  transmission  services"  anywhere  in  the  EC. 
Although "money transmission services" are not defined in the 2BCD (or elsewhere), it is clear that, 
in order for EC banks to operate outside their country of incorporation with competitive equality, it is 
necessary that they be allowed access to the host country IFfS on an equal footing  with domestic 
institutions. 
34.  However, according to Article 21(5) of the 2BCD, host Member States "keep the power 
of preventing or punishing irregularities which are contrary to the legal rules they have adopted in the 
interest of the general good". Therefore, should an EC bank gain remote access to an IFfS based in 
another country, it may be required, by the system or the host central bank, to prove that it meets the 
relevant aspects of the legal requirements of the host country  (e.g. those relating to the finality  of 
payments). It would also have to accept contractual commitments with the institution managing the 
IFfS or with the other participants. Legal and technical provisions however, should be proportionate 
to  their  aim  and  should  not  unnecessarily  introduce  requirements  which,  in  fact,  would  be 
disadvantageous for foreign participants. 
35.  EC  central banks have already made efforts to co-ordinate their oversight functions  in 
order to facilitate remote access to IFfS. However, at the moment remote access remains difficult to 
obtain for technical reasons (e.g. the lack of harmonisation of banks identification numbers, on which 
IFfS rely  to  establish  automatic  links  between  their  participants),  as  well  as  for  legal  reasons 
(important  differences  between  participation  rules,  such  as  those  relating  to  the  respective 15 
responsibility of the sending  and receiving institution). Work presently undertaken on legal issues 
under  the  aegis  of an  EC  Commission  working  group  (see  Chapter  4),  and  by  the  Eur~an 
Committee for Banking Standards (see Chapter 5) is likely to facilitate remote access in the future. 
However, since this work will take some time to be completed and put into effect, EC central banks 
should strive to find solutions, on a case by case basis, adopting a pragmatic approach, in order to 
make it possible for banks to get remote access to IFfS. 
2.4 Access criteria 
36.  Principle 3; Transparency of access criteria 
Access criteria to interbank funds transfer systems should be laid down in a public 
document. This document should also set out procedures for removing a participant from the 
system. Additional criteria beyond those embodied in Principles 1 and 2 may apply to direct 
participants. These criteria may include one or more of the following conditions; 
a.  adequate financial strength of the institution; 
b.  minimum number of transactions; 
c.  the payment of an entry fee; 
d.  the approval (on  technical or creditworthiness grounds) of either the owner/manager of 
the system or the direct participants; 
e.  the approval  of the local  central  bank  (when  possible within  the legal  context of the 
country), 
37.  Access  and  removal  rules  should  be  documented  to  ensure  transparency  of access 
conditions  to  IFfS.  This  is  a  prerequisite  for  achieving  free  competition  in payment  services 
throughout the EC. EC central banks feel that although access criteria should normally be restricted to 
those set out in Principle 3, in some circumstances other criteria may be justified in some EC systems. 
A description of  the access criteria which apply to the main EC IFfS is given in table 2, (page 17). 
38.  The first three criteria above are of an objective nature. It is clear that the levels at which 
they are set should not be used to discriminate against any credit institution. Credit limits (including a 
zero credit limit) may be put on the exposures of the clearing vis-a-vis individual participants on the 
basis of financial  data or ratios.  Minimum traffic  conditions  should be set at  less  stringent levels 
during a trial period which should be granted to any new participant. If  the payment of an entry fee is 
a condition for access, it should be determined according to objective criteria, including non-recurring 
costs already borne by the existing participants and/or additional costs for existing participants created 
by the admission of a new one. If  a membership fee is charged periodically for participation in the 
system, it should not discriminate between new entrants and other participants. 
39.  EC central banks agree that some discretion should be given to the owners/managers of 
IFfS in relation both to technical risks  and  to credit risks.  In order to limit technical risks, it is 
necessary for the managers of IFfS to satisfy themselves that, as far as possible, any new applicant, or 
existing participant, is technically capable of avoiding any operational problems. In the event that the 16 
applicant (or participant) is  an institution whose technical infrastructures are located in another EC 
country, the review of these infrastructures will be made in conjunction with the central bank of the 
country in which the infrastructures are located. 
40.  Credit risks are another reason that may lead the managing body of the system to refuse 
participation status to a given applicant. For example, in net-settlement systems where settlement is 
guaranteed by a loss-sharing agreement, all participants are collectively liable for the failure of one of 
them. Therefore, they need to be able to assess and control the risks they are taking vis-a-vis each of 
their counterparts. Credit risks need also to be  assessed and  controlled in gross-settlement systems 
where overdraft facilities (  collateralised or uncollateralised) are provided. 
41.  As  overseers  of payment  systems  in their  countries,  EC  central  banks  usually  have 
ultimate responsibility, in some form,  for the consequences of difficulties in these  systems.  These 
oversight functions are supported by powers and procedures whose nature varies from one country to 
another, according to the local legal provisions and to the strategy chosen by individual EC central 
banks. In this context, when legally possible, and considered appropriate, EC central banks should be 
entitled to have fmal discretion on membership in any IFTS, even in those of a private nature, in order 
to discourage weaker banks from participating5• For systems which settle at the central bank, such 
power could be exercised through the opening of a settlement account on a discretionary basis. 
42.  Discretion in giving access to IFTS should not lead to any form of discrimination and in 
particular should not be a way to circumvent Principle 2.  In fact, it is expected that when a foreign 
bank applies to participate in a local IFTS, the host central bank will consult with the home central 
bank before taking its decision. When the managing body of the IFTS is not the central bank itself, it 
is expected to consult with the local central bank. Moreover, if it wishes to turn down an application 
for participation it is expected that the local central bank will be provided with all the information on 
the basis of which the decision is to be taken. 
43.  EC central banks agree that access criteria may differ according to the nature of the IFTS, 
and in particular in relation to the riskiness of these systems: the less protected against systemic risk 
an  IFTS  is,  the  more  restrictive  its  access  conditions  need  to  be.  Therefore,  for  example,  until 
adequate risk-control measures have been applied, it should be  a requirement for any  non-protected 
net-settlement system- which entails significant risks for the participants, major systemic risks and 
moral hazard for the central bank - that only institutions of the highest standing should be admitted. 
But, in real-time gross-settlement systems  - which minimise the risks  for  the participants - central 
5  In accordance with principle 1, the explicit approval of the central bank is required if the applicant is not a credit 
institution. 17 
Table 2; Participation in the main EC lar~:e-value IFTS 
1. Existing participants 
Direct participants 
- incl. branches of other EC banks 
- incl. branches of  non-EC banks 
- incl. remote participants 
:Qire~,;;t partigpm:u  ..  ~; non-hanks 
- Public authorities 
- Supervised financial institutions 
- Corporations 
Indirect partijjpants 
2. Access criteria 
- Written rules 
- Removal rules 
- Minimum level of data or ratios 
representative of financial strength 
- Minimum number of transactions 
- Payment of an entry fee 
- Approval from the owner/manager 
or the direct participants 
- Approval from the local central bank 
1. Existing participants 
Direct participant<; 
- incl. branches of other EC banks 
- incl. branches of  non-EC banks 
- incl. remote participants 
:Qire~,;;t participants; nOD-banks 
- Public authorities 
- Supervised financial institutions 
- Corporations 
Indirect participants 
2. Access criteria 
- Written rules 
- Removal rules 
- Minimum level of data or ratios 
representative of  financial strength 
- Minimum number of transactions 
- Payment of an entry fee 
- Approval from the owner/manager 
or the direct participants 
- Approval from the local central bank 
+  =yes 
- =no 
n.a = not applicable 
?  = not yet decided 
x  = no figure available 
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banks should be able to grant access to a wider range of institutions. However, central banks need to 
be  careful  not  to  encourage  the  existing  participants  in  a  more  risky  IFfS  to  avoid  or  de~ay 
improvements to the safety features of the system in order to keep any competitive advantage derived 
from restrictive access conditions. The improvement of the safety features of IFfS should allow some 
systems which currently have a limited membership to be more open in the future. 
44.  Different criteria may be set for indirect participants. They would have to be consistent 
with the nature of  the responsibilities of  indirect participants in the system. 
CHAPTER 3; RISK MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
3.1 Minimisation of systemic risk 
45.  One of  the major objectives ofEC central banks is to minimise systemic risks in payment 
systems and, as far as possible, to eliminate them. Systemic risk is defined in the Blue Book as  "the 
risk that the failure  of one  participant in an IFfS or  securities  settlement  system,  as  in financial 
markets generally, to meet his required obligations will cause other participants or financial firms to 
be unable to meet their obligations when due". There are at least two kinds of problems which may 
stem from the improper functioning of IFfS: technical risks and settlement risks. 
Technical risks 
46.  Technical  risks  arise  because  of the  possibility  that  a  major  failure  in the  technical 
infrastructure of one or several participants, or of the IFfS itself, may interrupt the flow of payments, 
thereby  creating  uncertainties  and  concerns  about  the  finality  of the  payments.  The  computer 
breakdown at the Bank of New York, one of  the major clearers of US government securities, in 1985, 
has become a traditional example of  how this risk could materialise. It is part of the oversight duty of 
EC central banks to ensure that the participants and the IFfS themselves pay enough attention to these 
problems,  for  example  through  appropriate  back-up  equipment  and  adequate  technical  audits. 
However, EC central banks recognise that it would be over-ambitious to believe that they could aim at 
the elimination of  technical risks. 
Settlement risks 
47.  Settlement risk is  defined in the Blue Book as  "a general term used to designate both 
credit and liquidity risks in a transfer system, i.e. the risk that a party will fail  to meet one or more 
obligations to its counterparties or to a settlement agent or settlement institution". 
48.  Settlement risks  are  particularly important in net-settlement systems  (NSS)  since, until 
the time of  settlement, (generally at the end of  the day), all participants with net credit positions have a 
credit exposure  vis-a-vis  the participants  with  net  debit  positions.  In the  event  of a  failure  of a 
participant with a net debit position, the traditional unwinding clause, if applied, is likely to create 
enormous difficulties for the remaining banks which would have to face losses and/or to close out, at a 19 
very late hour of the day, unexpected new  treasury positions,  which could lead to further failures. 
These risks are very difficult to control although efforts have already been made in several countries, 
within  and  outside  the  EC,  to  reduce  the  extent  of the  consequences  of settlement  failures,  for 
example, by introducing net debit caps or loss sharing agreements in multilateral NSS. 
49.  Moreover, the systemic effects of a settlement failure in NSS have increased in line with 
progress  in information and  communication technology,  which has  allowed  banks,  for  their  own 
account and for the account of their customers, to process a growing number of payments during the 
day. At the same time, competition has forced them to make out-payments in anticipation of incoming 
funds before the latter are irrevocably settled. A requirement which would force the major customers 
of the banks to wait for  the irrevocable settlement of incoming funds  at the end of the day  would 
reduce the efficiency of the financial  markets  and  the economy  as  a  whole,  and  is  therefore  not 
acceptable. As a result central banks' efforts to minimise the systemic risks involved in the functioning 
of IFI'S, and as far as possible to eliminate them, should focus on the reduction (and, if possible, the 
elimination) of credit risks outstanding during the day between participants in IFI'S. 
The advanta~:e of  real-time gross-settlements at the central bank 
50.  In theory,  the  only  way  to  eliminate  settlement risks  is  to  ensure that payments  are 
immediately and irrevocably settled (real-time gross-settlement- RTGS) in the books of institutions 
which run no risk of failure,  i.e.  central banks.  However, to control their credit risks, central banks 
which are settlement agents of RTGS systems need to be entitled to reject or put in a queue payments 
which exceed available funds on the account of the sending institution6.  Consequently, two kinds of 
residual risks remain: first, a credit risk, if the receiving bank is aware of payments which are rejected 
or put in a queue  by  the central  bank,  but still  makes  use  of the  anticipated  funds  or allows  its 
customers to make use of them; and second, a liquidity risk if the number of unsettled payments is 
such that the flow of payments through the IFI'S is blocked up. 
51.  However,  there  is  a  major  difference  between  systemic risks  linked  to  NSS  and  the 
residual risks linked to RTGS systems because, in the latter, risks are more easily manageable. They 
could even be eliminated provided that, over time, the participants modify their behaviour so that: 
6 
even when they are aware of payment instructions due to be sent to them, receiving banks do 
not use the funds before the corresponding amounts are irrevocably credited to their accounts at 
the central bank; 
Therefore, in the rest of this report,  a real-time gross-settlement system (RTGS) can be defined as:  (1)  a funds 
transfer system (see para. 3); (2) in which payment orders are processed one by one in real-time; and (3) which 
provides  for  the  immediate  settlement of all  payments,  provided  that  there  are  sufficient funds  or overdraft 
facilities available on the sending institution's account with the settlement agent. 20 
participants manage their payment flows  efficiently during the day  in order to send payment 
orders only when they have sufficient liquidity available.  7 
52.  EC central banks recognise that risk minimisation is an objective which will be the result 
of an evolutionary process in which the functioning  rules  of IFTS  will be redesigned and in which 
banks will learn how to better manage their payment flows,  so that the running costs of the systems 
can be kept at a reasonable level. In any case, additional costs should ultimately be borne by the users 
of  the payment services, i.e. the banks' customers. 
53.  EC central banks are  also  conscious that efficient risk management policies necessitate 
close consultation with the banking communities, in order to convince them of  the importance of  their 
action, so that it is not circumvented by the development of  informal net-settlement systems. 
54.  For these reasons, EC central banks believe that it is the responsibility of each of them to 
design, in consultation with the banks in its country the risk reduction measures which are the most 
appropriate, and although they all agree that systemic risks should be minimised, they consider that 
progress towards this objective may  be made at  a different pace in each individual country.  In the 
short run, they consider that Principles 4, 5 and 6 below should be implemented as soon as possible to 
ensure a minimum level of harmonisation. 'This would help to limit systemic risks in all EC countries 
individually, and in the Single Market area more generally, where it is  essential that improvements 
made by individual countries are not threatened, through cross-border participation in IFTS, by high 
levels of systemic risks in other EC countries. These efforts are consistent with those being made by 
the major non-EC central banks at the moment. 
3.2 The need for RTGS systems in all EC countries 
55.  Principle 4: Real-time gross-settlement systems 
As  soon  as feasible,  every member state should have a  real-time gross-settlement 
system into which as many large-value payments as possible should be channelled. Such systems 
should settle across accounts at the central bank and have sound legal, technical and prudential 
features which are compatible across EC Member States. 
56.  As a means of handling large-value and urgent payments, RTGS systems which settle at 
the central bank have a number of very important advantages. In particular, as explained in para. 50, 
they enable the risks  arising  from  the delay  between payment and  settlement to be eliminated.  In 
addition, RTGS systems provide an important foundation stone, not only for the ultimate settlement of 
other IFTS  (such as  net-settlement  systems)  but also  for  a variety  of different forms  of delivery-
versus-payment arrangements in securities markets and in foreign exchange markets. Last, and by no 
means  least, preliminary studies  conducted by the Working  Group  on EC  Payment  Systems  have 
already  suggested  that  an  EC-wide  large-value  IFTS,  needed  for  stage  III  of EMU,  should  be 
7  In both respects, it might be useful for the RTGS systems to give information on incoming funds to the beneficiary 
bank only after they are irrevocably settled. 21 
constructed by linking domestic systems which would have to be based on RTGS  in order to avoid 
complex problems of risk control. 
57.  Some member states may decide to have more than one  RTGS  system if, for example, 
different systems are used for  different types  of payments  or by  different types  of institutions. EC 
central  banks  also  recognise  that  settlement  across  central  bank  accounts  inevitably  involves  the 
central  bank in the  day-to-day  operation  of the  system.  However,  such  an  involvement  could  be 
limited to the provision of settlement facilities  and  need  not imply  central bank ownership of the 
system. 
Payments to be included in the system 
58.  In order to minimise risks  it would be desirable  for  as  many  large-value payments  as 
possible to be routed through RTGS  systems. Each central bank may decide what action to take to 
achieve this; there is no need for a co-ordinated approach involving, for example, a common rule that 
all payments of a certain type or size should be routed through RTGS systems. However, EC central 
banks agree that if large-value payments are routed through alternative systems in which significant 
risks  are  present, then appropriate risk control measures  (including the possibility of conversion to 
RTGS)  will need to be  applied to those systems  also.  In other words,  any  freedom  given to credit 
institutions to choose between IFfS should not lead to an unacceptable level of systemic risk. 
The provision of liquidity 
59.  A move from net-settlement systems (NSS) to RTGS systems eliminates the provision of 
credit  between  participants  which  is  granted  automatically,  when  netting  is  involved,  by  the 
participants with a net credit position to those with a net debit position. Therefore, with RTGS, new 
ways to provide liquidity to IFfS and their participants may  be required to prevent payments from 
being blocked. 
60.  RTGS  systems  exist,  at  the  moment,  in five  EC  countries  and  the  way  liquidity  is 
provided to them varies from  one  system to another:  in Italy and in Germany liquidity is provided 
mainly by the use of the required reserves during the day; in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
France, intra-day debit facilities can be granted by the central banks (in the first two countries, they 
must be fully collateralised, while in Denmark and in France- when the system is fully operational-
they may be partially uncollateralised). 
61.  In the near future,  it would be difficult to harmonise the main characteristics of RTGS 
systems in the EC  and,  in particular, the way liquidity is  provided to them, for the three following 
reasons:  first,  EC  countries  will  continue  to  have  various  levels  of reserve  requirements  (if any); 
second, in countries which intend to phase out large-value NSS, banks will no longer be able to get 
automatic  intra-day  inter-participant  credit facilities8,  and  finally,  in  some  EC  countries,  the  law 
8  The percentage of large-value payments which are processed through the RTGS systems is very different: a large 
majority of them in Denmark,  in  France  (when  TBF is  fully  implemented)  and  in  the UK (when  CHAPS  is 22 
forbids  the  central  bank  to  grant  uncollateralised  daylight  overdrafts,  while  in  other  countries, 
uncollateralised overdrafts have been granted to banks to facilitate the switching of all  large-value 
payments from NSS to RTGS systems.9 
62.  Under the present circumstances, this lack of harmonisation is not likely to provoke an 
undesirable diversion of payment flows because the existence of different currencies in the EC, will 
deter banks  and other economic agents  from  switching their operations into the currency in which 
payments can be made at the lowest cost. Only if  payments in one currency could be made using IFI'S 
established in other countries could regulatory arbitrage occur. EC  central banks would need to co-
operate if  that were to start happening. 
63.  Because the domestic RTGS  systems which currently exist in some countries, or which 
will be created as a follow-up of Principle 4, are likely to be linked under stage III of the EMU, some 
further harmonisation of legal, technical and prudential standards will be needed in due course. First, it 
will be necessary to ensure that the links which are to be established will not diminish the safety level 
of EC  payment  systems  throughout  EMU,  as  well  as  in  any  participating  countryto.  Second, 
harmonisation should also limit competitive distortions among the countries which will participate in 
monetary union, so that there is no traffic diversion from RTGS systems run by some central banks to 
other systems in other countries which apply lower standards. 
9 
10 
converted to RTGS) but a clear minority in the Netherlands, in Italy and in Germany. Large-value net settlement 
systems are scheduled to disappear in France in the near future. Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy (in the 
long run) have similar plans. In other countries where large-value NSS exist, there is no plan to eliminate them so 
far. 
Central banks which grant uncollateralised daylight overdrafts may charge interest for the use of these facilities in 
order to create an  incentive for  the banks  not  to  rely on them.  As  soon  as  the  banks  have  been given time to 
improve the management of their payment flows  (for example, perhaps by creating an intra-day money market), 
uncollateralised overdrafts could be reduced and, possibly eliminated. 
In this respect, EC central banks might have to see how some of the standards set out in the Lamfalussy Report 
might be transposed to RTGS systems. 23 
Table 3; Main features of real-time ~:ross-settlement systems settlinl,! with EC central banks 
B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  p 
Existing or planned (year)  1995  1985  988  1996  - 1995  95-96  989  (2)  1985  1994 
(1) 
Liquidity provision 
- Reserve requirements which can be used  - - +  ?  n.a  neg  ?  +  ?  + 
for payment during the day  -
- Intraday credit facilities 
- collateralised  +  - +  ?  n.a  +  +  ?  ?  + 
- uncollateralised  - +  - ?  n.a  +  - - ?  +  -
-
Other Risk management features 
- Queue management facilities  +  - +  ?  n.a  +  ?  ?  ?  + 
- Pricing of intraday overdrafts  - - - ?  n.a  ?  ?  ?  ?  - -
-
(1)  =in the Netherlands, the central bank system is a gross settlement system in which some payments are settled 
in real time, while others are settled at the end of day. 
(2)  = no date for implementation yet available 
+  = yes or high 
=no 
3.3 Laru-value net-settlement systems 
? = not yet decided 
neg. = negligible 
n.a  =  not applicable 
64.  Principle 5; Large-value net-settlement systems 
Provided they settle at the central bank, large-value net-settlement systems  may 
continue to operate in parallel to real-time gross-settlement systems but, in the near future, they 
should (a) settle on the same-day as the exchange of the payment instruments; and (b) meet the 
Lamfalussy standards in full. 
65.  EC central banks recognise that at the moment many large-value systems are not based 
on real-time gross settlement across central bank accounts. Such systems might continue to exist in 
parallel with the RTGS systems that member states should introduce. However they feel that when 
existing systems are based on netting, a programme should be devised and implemented as soon as 
possible, although it is recognised that implementation may take a period of  years in some cases. They 
incline to the view that no special concessions should be given to systems which may exist in parallel 
with RTGS  systems  in order to encourage  their continued  existence;  indeed,  it is important that 









Table 4. Risk control measures in large-value net-settlement systems 
1. Settlement in central banks' 
accounts 
2. Same-day settlement 
3. Provisional assessment vs 
Lamfalussy standards 
1. Legal framework 
- contractual (  +) or advisory (-) 
netting 
- if contractual, legally 
enforceable (  +) or not (-) 
2. Participants' awareness 
3. Risk management 
4. Settlement completion 
5. Fair and open access 
6. Technical reliability 
+  =yes 
- =no 
n.a = not applicable 
B  B  D 
Clearing  CEC  EAF 
House 
+  +  + 
+  +  + 
+  +  + 
+  +  + 
+  +  + 
- - -
- - -
+  +  + 
+  +  + 
GR  E  F  I  I 
ACO  STMD  Sagittaire  ME  SIPS 
+  +  +  + 
+  +  +  + 
- +  - -
n.a  +  n.a.  n.a 
+  +  +  + 
- - - -
- - - -
+  +  +  + 
+  +  +  + 
1 =from 1st January 1994 





















NL  UK  EUR 
8007  CHAPS  ECU 
System  Clearin,g 
+  +  -
+  +  + 
?  +  -
?  +  n.a. 
+  +  + 
- +  + 
- - -
+  +  + 
+  +  +1-
66.  Same-day settlement is a requirement for a large-value NSS  in order to limit settlement 
risks. Settlement at a central bank is a necessity to prevent the participants from taking risks on the 
settlement agent. 
67.  In accordance with the objective of  EC central banks to minimise systemic risks linked to 
payment systems and, as far as possible, to eliminate them, EC central banks believe that the prompt 
and full implementation of  the principles set out in the Lamfalussy Report would be a first and major 
step in their risk reduction programme. In the long run they will also consider the option of requiring 
all participants in large-value net-settlement systems to collateralise fully their debit positions. These 
major steps will have to be taken in consultation with banking communities. However, EC  central 
banks  feel  that even fully-collateralised  NSS  would  still  be  more  risky  than RTGS  systems  - in 
particular because of the uncertainties about the legal basis of netting, especially where banks from 
more than one country are involved11. 
11  This remark does not necessarily apply to  systems which exist to facilitate the netting of contracts (e.g.  foreign 
exchange contracts).  Indeed,  as  mentioned in the  Lamfalussy  Report,  such  schemes  are  likely  to  reduce risks, 
provided that they are properly designed. 25 
3.4 Other IFTS 
68.  Principle 6: Other interbank funds transfer systems 
As a part of their oversight function, EC central banks will assess the scale and the 
nature of the settlement risk in all interbank funds transfer systems operating in their country. 
While seeking to  reduce as  far as  possible the risks  in  these systems, EC central banks may 
adopt, for systems not covered by Principles 4 and 5, a somewhat flexible approach which takes 
into account the costs and benefits of any envisaged solution. Over time, whenever systems are 
changed or redesigned, increasingly high standards of risk-reduction should be achieved 
69.  Large-value systems which are  covered by Principles 4 and 5  are  those which handle, 
amongst others, the payments associated with wholesale  financial  markets  where the payments are 
typically time critical and for large amounts. Since the potential for significant settlement risk in such 
systems is large, Principles 4 and 5 emphasise the need for rigorous risk-reduction policies. However, 
Member States  also  have  other  IFfS whose  nature  varies  widely.  They  can be  divided  into  two 
groups: 
retail  systems  which,  by  definition  (see  para.  10),  handle  large  volumes  of small-value 
payments, for which same-day settlement is not a critical factor; 
gross-settlement systems which do not fit into Principle 4 either because they provide for end-of 
day settlement, or because the settlement agent is not the central bank12. 
70.  The scale of  the risks in these various systems differs considerably: in some the aggregate 
risks may be small, whereas in others they may be almost as significant as those of the major large-
value NSS systems covered by Principle 5. Therefore, EC central banks agree that they need to adopt 
a flexible approach towards risk-reduction policies in such systems. In devising such an approach, two 
main considerations need to be borne in mind. On the one hand, central banks need to recognise that 
the cost of risk-reduction measures can be significant and therefore the solution adopted in each case 
needs to be in proportion to the scale of  the problem. On the other hand, central banks need also to be 
alert to the possibility that, where risk reduction measures in other systems are less rigorous than those 
in systems  covered  by  Principles  4  and  5,  there  is  a danger. that, to  save  money,  banks  or their 
customers may increasingly route large-value payments through the other systems. 
71.  A key element of the flexible approach should therefore be an assessment by the central 
bank, in conjunction with the operators and members of the system, as  appropriate, of the nature and 
scale of  the risks involved in each system. Such a survey should be repeated from time to time. On the 
basis of  the assessment of the seriousness of the problem, suitable risk-reduction policies should then 
be drawn up.  In some cases it may be decided that the risks are  sufficiently small that no action is 
necessary. In other cases one or more of a variety of risk reduction measures may be appropriate. For 
example, a limit could be put on the maximum size of individual payments handled by the system; or 
12  Such systems exist for historical reasons. Large-value gross-settlement systems which may be created in the future 
should provide for real-time settlement at the central bank. 26 
banks could be required to keep their positions within agreed limits (perhaps monitored ex-post); or 
some element of collateralisation could be introduced. In some cases, RTGS or full implementation of 
the Lamfalussy standards, including the operation of ex-ante limits and loss-sharing agreements, may 
be a necessary policy or, alternatively, in cases where speed is less important, the hatching of payment 
instructions, to be settled gross before being passed on to the recipient bank, may be adequate. 
72.  The nature of the system and the assessment of the scale of the risks involved should 
determine the minimum risk standards that need to be  adopted in order to ensure that a particular 
system is secure and efficient. However, depending on the costs of doing so, central banks, system 
operators and participants may decide to go beyond this minimum level. In some systems it may be 
relatively easy to introduce ex-ante limits or batched gross settlement, thereby making these attractive 
options even where the scale of  the risk is relatively small. But in other cases an expensive redesign of 
the system might be required, making it harder to justify such options, particularly in the short-term. 
In the longer-term, as systems come to be redesigned anyway, it should be possible to achieve even 
higher risk-reduction or even risk-elimination standards. 
73.  As Principle 6 leaves a great deal of flexibility to individual central banks, each of them 
should be in a position to elucidate its policies to other EC  central banks, in particular when cross-
border participation is involved. 
CHAPTER4:LEGALISSQES 
74.  Principle 7: Legal issues 
The legal  basis  of domestic  payment systems  should  be  sound and enforceable. 
Inconsistencies  between  domestic  legal  systems  in  the  EC  which  increase  risks  in  payment 
systems need to  be analysed and, as far as possible, reduced. As  a first step, where necessary, 
EC central banks will  press for changes to  certain aspects of national  bankruptcy laws  (e.g. 
"zero-hour clause"). 
75.  As stated in the Main Report, "present uncertainties within, and inconsistencies between, 
domestic legal systems increase the risks in payment systems". To analyse those issues and to propose 
solutions,  the Working  Group  on EC  Payment Systems  decided  to  create  a Task Force of Legal 
Experts which has co-ordinated its efforts with the Working Group of Government Experts on EC 
Payment Systems, set up by the EC Commission. 
76.  Although the remit of the latter also extends to issues relating to consumer protection, it 
covers the main legal points which were already mentioned in the Main Report: 
enforceability of  netting arrangements; 
harmonisation of bankruptcy laws, as far as they affect cross-border payments; 
legal aspects of  realising collateral in EC payment systems; 
revocability of  payment instructions, and; 
finality of interbank payments. 27 
77.  The EC  Commission appointed a private law firm to undertake a comparative study of 
these issues across Member States; it should reveal whether there are impediments to the development 
of EC payment systems which require solutions either through contractual arrangements or through 
statutory provisions at a national or Community level. The Task Force of Legal Experts assisted the 
Commission in formulating the terms of reference for the law firm and the Secretariat gave assistance 
in analysing typical central bank issues  such as  the enforceability of netting  and the realisation of 
collateral. The comparative study is expected to be available this autumn. The EC  Commission will 
subsequently prepare a report which EC central banks will have to consider. 
78.  There is one issue however which is both crucial and yet relatively straightforward from a 
payment system point of view: the so-called "zero-hour clause" which in some countries  (Italy, the 
Netherlands and, maybe, France) allows the liquidator of a failed institution to revoke all payments 
made  on the  day  the  latter  is  declared  bankrupt.  This  clause,  if applied,  could  create  important 
systemic disruptions, and hamper the efforts made by central banks to minimise them (see Chapter 3). 
Moreover, the effects of an  application of the zero-hour clause may  spread to other EC  countries, 
including those in which it is  not provided for  in law, through cross-border participation in IFTS. 
Therefore,  it is  in the interests  of all  EC  countries  that  such provisions  are  eliminated,  as  far  as 
payments processed through IFTS are concerned, from the legal system of each Member State. 
CHAPTER 5: TECHNICAL ISSUES 
79.  Principle 8: Technical issues 
Compatible banking standards and efficient channels of communication  between 
EC payment systems are desirable and will assist the processing of cross-border payments in the 
context of the Single Market. They will  become increasingly important in  view  of EMU. EC 
central banks will support and participate in the efforts made by banking communities in these 
fields. 
5.1 Infrastructures 
80.  Para.  6.1  of part  B  of the  Lamfalussy  Report13  stressed  the  importance  of reliable 
technical infrastructures for the smooth functioning of payment systems. Part 2.5.4 of the Main Report 
emphasised the importance of compatible infrastructures to facilitate cross-border payments. Work on 
these issues is in progress:  at the retail level, EC  central banks are  aware of new payment channels 
being studied by the banking communities, such as improved correspondent banking relationships or 
linkages  between  automated  clearing  houses14;  as  far  as  large-value  payments  are  concerned,  EC 
13 
14 
"The  providers  of netting  services  and,  in particular,  of multilateral  netting  systems  should  ensure  that  all 
hardware, software, and communications facilities which support daily operations have a high degree of reliability 
and integrity. In particular, contingency plans should be established for the failure of each of these facilities which 
should include the availability of back-up facilities capable of completing the settlement process within the normal 
parameters of the relevant money markets as  well as  the completion of any necessary accounting and processing 
work prior to the start of the next business day." 
EC central banks intend to become involved in the discussions concerning the settlement aspects of these schemes. 28 
central banks have begun to study the possibility of improving the links between existing or future 
RTGS systems in preparation for Stage III of EMU. 
5.2. Standards 
81.  EC  central banks are  also interested in improvements in the banking standards without 
which modem IFfS would not be able to function. Such improvements should facilitate cross border-
payments, by reducing their cost and increasing their speed. Standards used by national IFfS at the 
moment are  not compatible at the EC  level. EC  banks have begun to investigate the possibility of 
harmonising banking standards within the EC. In particular, they have set up a European Committee 
for  Banking Standards (ECBS) which is currently focusing,  among  other subjects, on cross-border 
payments.  EC  central  banks  are  kept  informed  of the  activities  of this  Committee  due  to  the 
participation as an observer of the Rapporteur of the Working Group on EC Payment Systems in the 
Technical Steering Committee of the ECBS. Of course, this work has a long lead time, but EC central 
banks will need to ensure that the standards are not likely to reduce the soundness of the EC payment 
system as  a whole.  Such harmonised standards  may  subsequently be used by  EC  central banks in 
establishing links between domestic large-value systems. 
CHAPTER 6; CENTRAL BANKS' PRICING POLICIES FOR PAYMENT SERVICES 
82.  Principle 9; Pricing policies of EC central banks 
The pricing policies of EC central banks, in respect of payment systems functions, 
will aim at the avoidance of any competitive distortion within the context of the Single Market 
and in preparation for EMU. As a general objective, such policies will aim at the full recovery 
by the central banks of the costs of these services. 
6.1. The requirements of the Sina:le Market 
83.  For historical  reasons,  the  basis  of EC  central  banks  pricing  policies  differs:  some 
provide free  payment services,  some just charge  a token amount,  others  endeavour to cover their 
variable  costs  or their  full  costs.  Except in the  latter  case,  these  services  are  in fact  subsidised, 
sometimes  without  any  economic  justification.  Moreover,  some  central  banks  rely  on  explicit 
charging  arrangements  while  others  use  implicit  charging  through  (for  example)  unremunerated 
balances. Finally, central banks' cost bases differ widely. Within the context of the Single Market, 
these different pricing policies, structures and costs might create competitive distortions which would 
hamper the development of a "level playing field"  within the EC  because, first, they could make it 
harder for the private sector to compete with central banks  for  services which do not need to be a 
public monopoly and, second, because they may enable banks to cross-subsidise to different degrees 
other  products  they  offer  to  their  customers.  Therefore,  EC  central  banks  feel  that  a  certain 
harmonisation of  their pricing policies should be reached in a way which is compatible with economic 
efficiency, i.e. by making strong efforts to recover costs, or at least operating costs in the short run. 
84.  The "full cost objective" is to be seen as  a medium-term target and there might be some 
exceptions to this general rule in certain circumstances. One of them could be founded on the need to 
encourage the use of  more efficient payment means or systems (e.g. in the case of a new system where 
the number of payments processed is still low). Another exception might be motivated by the need to 29 
ensure a fair degree of competition between systems which are not equally secure; this could be the 
case, for instance, if real-time gross settlement systems compete with net settlement systems which 
have not yet implemented an adequate risk reduction programme. 
6.2. The consequences of Monetary Union 
85.  In  the  immediate  future  there  is  no  compelling  reason  to  go  further  than  the 
harmonisation of the underlying Principles on which pricing policies are  based since the continued 
existence of different currencies, between which foreign exchange risk remains, will make it highly 
unlikely that banks will switch their payment flows  from one country to another in order to benefit 
from the lowest prices.  However, particularly in Stage III of EMU, the risk of undesired shifts of 
payment flows from one country to another, or from one system to another, will entail a further need 
for price harmonisation in the EMU area. 
CHAPTER 7; OPERATING HOQRS FOR IFTS 
86.  Principle 10; Operating hours 
The overlap between operating hours of the ml\ior EC interbank funds  transfer 
systems (and in particular the hours of RIGS systems) is necessary and could be increased in 
order to facilitate cross-border payments  and delivery  versus  payment mechanisms.  In this 
respect, and as a preparatory step towards EMU, EC central banks will  consider closer co-
ordination of the operating hours of their settlement services. 
7.1. The regyirements of  the Sina=le Market 
87.  Closer harmonisation of  the operating hours of the main EC IFI'S would facilitate cross-
border payments, and would be a step forward in the development of delivery-versus-payment (DVP) 
mechanisms as RTGS systems are introduced. This point could be of particular importance as far as 
foreign exchange transactions are  concerned, as  a means of reducing cross-currency settlement risk 
(Herstatt risk). Although this preoccupation is not specific to Europe (see the report prepared by the 
GlO central banks on "Central banks payment and settlement services, with respect to cross-border 
and multi-currency transactions"), harmonisation is probably easier to reach in EC countries, because 
they work in only three time zones. As shown in Table 5, a limited overlap exists at present, at the end 
of  the morning, between the operating hours of  the main EC IFI'S. An objective for the future should 
be to extend this overlap somewhat. 
88.  Since all IFI'S reach ultimate settlement at the central bank, their operating hours depend 
on the periods of time during which central banks  are  offering settlement services; no IFI'S could 
continue to work for same-day value once the central bank is closed for settlement. Therefore, to a 
large  extent,  the  extension  of the  overlap  of the  operating  hours  of EC  IFI'S  is  linked  to  the 
harmonisation  of the  settlement  times  of EC  central  banks.  However,  since  secure  DVP needs 
irrevocable payments, the efforts of  EC central banks should not focus too much on the harmonisation 
of end-of-day settlement, but on the harmonisation of the period of time during  which they offer 
continuous settlement. In other words, all EC central banks should aim at the establishment of RIGS 
systems in their countries (see Principle 4) and have sufficient overlap between their operating hours. Time 
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Table 5: Operatin~: Hours of the major EC  lar~:e-value IFTS 
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89.  In EMU, greater harmonisation of central banks' operating hours is likely to be necessary for the 
establishment of a single integrated EC-wide payment system. In the immediate future, there is no need for a 
full harmonisation of the operating hours of central banks settlement services because, as explained in para. 85, 
no major undesired shift of payments is likely to occur as long as EC currencies do not have fiXed exchange-
rates. However, past experience has shown that it is often not easy to modify the times when central banks offer 
settlement services because this modification involves changes in the operating behaviour of the central bank 
itself, the IFfS which settle at the central bank and the fmancial markets (for which the closing time of the 
settlement services of the central bank is also the closing time for same-day transactions in the currency issued 31 
by the central bank). As a result, it would be helpful if any necessary convergence of closing times could be 
reached before Stage III of  EMU begins, preferably in a progressive way. 
PART C; FOLLOW-UP TO TWS REPORT 
1.  The ten principles proposed in this report give substance to Action 2 of  the Main Report published 
in September 1992. These principles are consistent with the evolution underway in domestic payment systems 
and should guide the action of  national central banks in this field. 
2.  The  aim of the ten principles  is  to ensure  that the  growth of cross-border  real  and  financial 
transactions resulting from the Single Market and the increase in cross-border participation in IFI'S allowed by 
the 2BCD are supported by an efficient and secure processing of payments  and by the successful efforts of 
national central banks to reduce systemic risks associated with payment systems. 
3.  The implementation of  the principles will be the result of a continuous process conducted primarily 
at the national level and by national central banks in co-operation with their countries' banking communities. As 
regards Principles 1 to 6, the Working Group feels that their specification is sufficiently advanced to permit 
direct implementation. Concerning Principles 7 to 10, further specification will follow from the result of other 
studies underway, in particular that which the EC Commission is conducting on legal issues, that of  the banking 
community on banking standards and infrastructures for retail cross-border payments, and that of EC central 
banks on payment systems in Stage Ill of  EMU. 
4.  Co-operative work among EC central banks should continue to monitor developments in the areas 
covered by this report, to deal with the problems that will arise in the implementation of the ten principles, and 
to improve their specifications and interpretation where necessary. In this respect, it is proposed that the group 
in charge of  this work reports annually to the Governors. Annex 1 
Action 2 of the report on "Issues of common concern to EC central banks 
in the field of payment systems" 
Differences between domestic interbank payment systems can affect the smoothness of 
cross-border payments in the EC and distort competitive conditions. They may also create risks for the 
integrity and stability of domestic and cross-border payment arrangements, since the latter can only be 
as  strong  as  their weakest links.  Finally, these differences may  create opportunities  for  regulatory 
arbitrage,  especially  with  irrevocably  ftxed  exchange  rates,  inducing  participants  to  effect  their 
payments through less costly but possibly inadequately protected systems. To  avert those risks, EC 
central banks will, in the context of their oversight of domestic payment systems, make sure that, as 
far as necessary and in accordance with the subsidiary principle, all interbank funds transfer systems 
share certain minimum common features on which the integrity and security of  the systems as a whole 
depend; these will include, wherever appropriate, use of gross settlement systems. Action to this end 
will have to be consistent with, and indeed will be an integral part of, possible work on an EC-wide 
system which will be needed in Stage Three of EMU (see Action line 3). Six areas are particularly 
important for this common work on domestic systems. 
Access  conditions:  A limited number of common principles will  be laid down for  access to 
domestic  funds  transfer  systems  to  ensure  the  financial  soundness  and  technical  reliability  of 
participants,  and  to  reduce  systemic  risk.  EC  central  banks  will  also  seek  to  ensure  that  the 
involvement  of non-banks  in  payment  operations  creates  no  additional  risks,  or  competitive 
distortions, in the interbank payment systems. 
Risk management policies: A core group of risk reduction measures will be agreed upon and 
applied to domestic interbank payment systems. These measures will need to be consistent with those 
identified  by  the  Committee  on Interbank Netting  Schemes.  Measures  will  be  studied to  contain 
interbank  positions  in net  settlement  schemes  (such  as  caps  and  /or  legal  agreements  to  limit 
exposures),  thereby  reducing  liquidity  and  credit  risks;  other  measures  (such  as  collateral  and 
loss-sharing formulae) could be applied to avoid systemic risk in netting schemes. Central banks will 
consider the  establishment,  wherever  appropriate,  of gross  settlement  systems  in place  of,  or in 
addition to, net settlement systems. Where central bank overdrafts in gross settlement systems are not 
fully collateralised, caps might need to be applied in these systems as well. 
Legal issues: Present uncertainties within, and inconsistencies between, domestic legal systems 
increase the risks in payment systems. EC central banks will address legal issues that are of particular 
importance for the integrity and stability of domestic and cross-border payment systems, including the 
finality  of payments  (bankruptcy  laws,  "zero-hour"  clauses),  and  the  revocability  of payment 
instructions.  They  will  also  endeavour  to  formulate  recommendations  on  legal  aspects  of net - 2-
settlement schemes with a view to their adoption in the law. Central banks should participate in any 
work on these issues, whether in the EC or elsewhere such an UNCITRAL. 
Standards  and  infrastructures:  The  technical  structures  of  payment  systems  as  well  as 
harmonised  working  methods  need  to  guarantee  operational  reliability  and  compatibility.  It  is 
particularly important for  central banks  to  work with the private sector in specifying the technical 
standards that would facilitate linkages between funds transfer systems. 
Pricin~: policies : EC central banks will endeavour to adapt common principles in respect of the 
prices at which they supply payment services. These principles need to favour the efficient allocation 
of resources, by the central banks and the commercial banks. 
Business  hours:  EC  central  banks  will  consider  whether  there  is  scope  for  reducing  the 
differences in business hours  for  their domestic large-value payment systems, to reduce settlement 
difficulties  and  temporal  exposures  in  the  foreign  exchange  and  other  financial  markets. GLOSSARY1  Annex2 
Automated Clearing House (ACH): an electronic clearing system, in which data on payment orders 
are  exchanged  by  magnetic  media,  or via  a telecommunication  network,  and  handled  by  a  data 
processing centre. 
Bilateral net settlement system:  a netting system in which participants' bilateral or net settlement 
positions are settled between every bilateral combination of  participants. 
Banking  organisation:  a  credit  institution  or  an  organisation  collectively  owned  by  credit 
institutions. (see para. 17) 
Caps: a risk management arrangement whereby limits are placed on the positions that participants in 
an interbank funds  transfer  system  can incur during  the  business  day;  they  may  be  set  by  each 
individual participant or by the body governing the transfer system; they can be set in multilateral net, 
bilateral net or (less  commonly) in gross terms  and  can be  either a credit cap or a debit cap;  for 
example, bilateral net credit caps, set by an individual participant, will constitute a limit on the credit 
exposure that that participant will accept vis-a-vis each other participant; in contrast, sender net debit 
caps may be set (by the governing body of the clearing system based on a particular formula), which 
limit the aggregate value of transfers that an individual participant may send to all other participants 
over and above its incoming transfers. 
Clearing:  a  set  of procedures  whereby  financial  institutions  present  and  exchange  data  and/or 
documents relating to funds  or securities transfers to other fmancial institutions at  a single location 
(clearing house). The procedures often also contain a mechanism for the calculation of participants' 
bilateral and/or multilateral net positions with a view to facilitating the settlement of their obligations 
on a net or net net basis. 
Correspondent banking: an arrangement under which one bank provides payment and other services 
to another bank. Payments through correspondents are often executed through reciprocal accounts (so-
called nostro and vostro  accounts), to which standing credit lines may  be attached.  Correspondent 
banking services are primarily provided across international boundaries but are also known as agency 
relationships in some domestic contexts. 
All definitions hereafter are taken from the Glossary of the Blue Book unless a reference to  a paragraph of this 
report is mentioned, or unless otherwise specified. -4-
Credit risk (or exposure): the risk that a counter party will not settle an obligation for full  value, 
either when due, or at any time thereafter. 
Cross currency settlement risk (or Herstatt risk): risk relating to the settlement of foreign exchange 
contracts which arises  when one of the counterparties to a contract pays  out one currency prior to 
receiving payment of  the other. 
Daylight credit (daylight overdraft or intra-day credit): credit extended for  a period of less than 
one business day; in a credit transfer system with end-of-day fmal settlement, daylight credit is tacitly 
extended by a receiving institution if it accepts and acts on a payment order even though it will not 
receive final funds until the end of  the business day. 
Delivery-versus-payment (DVP):  phrase  used to  summarise  the conditions that must hold if the 
counterparties to a transaction in an exchange-of-value system are not to be exposed to principal risk 
(the risk that one counterparty loses the full value of the transaction); DVP in its most rigorous form 
implies that both the asset transfer and the related funds transfer are  simultaneously irrevocable and 
unconditional for the parties involved. 
Direct participants (access) in IFTS: participants in an IFTS who are responsible to the settlement 
institution (or to all other direct participants) for the settlement of their own payments, those of their 
customers, and those of  the indirect participants on whose behalf they are settling . (see para. 11) 
Final settlement: settlement of the obligations between two parties by irrevocable transfer of credit 
across their accounts at a defined settlement institution. Where such transfers are made by irrevocable 
credit to  accounts  on the books  of a central bank, the transfer could be described  as  an  "ultimate 
settlement" in the economic sense that it is effected in central bank liabilities. 
Funds transfer system (FTS): a formal  arrangement, based on private contract or statute law, with 
multiple  membership,  common rules  and  standardised  arrangements,  for  the  transmission  and  the 
settlement of money obligations arising between the members. (see para. 3) 
Indirect access  (participants) to  IFTS:  a form  a membership which exists to varying  degrees  in 
FfS; it gives to institutions some functions and responsibilities of direct participation without going 
as far as entrusting them with the settlement responsibilities reserved to direct participants. (see para. 
12) 
Interbank  funds  transfer  system  (IFTS):  funds  transfer  systems  in  which  most  of  (or  all) 
participants are used primarily to process cashless payments which involve the credit institutions. (see 
para. 5) - 5-
Irrevocable transfer: a transfer which cannot be revoked by the transferor. 
Large-value payments, large-value IFTS:  payments  which related to one  of the four  categories 
mentioned in para. 9 of  this report. 
Liquidity risk: the risk from a participants failure to settle a debit position at the time due because it 
does not have enough liquid assets; liquidity risk does not imply that a participant is insolvent since 
he might be able to settle the required obligation at some unspecified time thereafter. 
Loss-sharing rule (or loss-sharing agreement):  an  agreement between participants  in a clearing 
system regarding the allocation of any loss arising when one or more participants fail to fulfil their 
obligations; the arrangement stipulates how the loss will be shared among the parties concerned in the 
event the agreement is activated. 
Multilateral net settlement system (multilateral NSS): a netting system in which direct participants 
settle only their net net positions resulting from the clearing process. 
Net settlement system  (NSS):  see  bilateral  net  settlement  system  and  multilateral  net  settlement 
system. 
Netting (or netting scheme): an agreed offsetting of positions or obligations by trading partners or 
participants in a system. The netting reduces a large number of individual positions or obligations to a 
smaller number of positions.  Netting may take several forms  which have varying  degrees  of legal 
enforceability in the event of default of  one of  the parties. 
Oversight (new definition): Central bank duty, principally intended to promote systemic stability. 
Payment: the satisfaction and discharge of an obligation by the debtor's irrevocable provision of an 
unconditional  claim  on a third party  acceptable  to  the  creditor  (for  example  bank notes,  deposit 
balance held at a financial institution or at the central bank). 
Payment order (or payment instruction): an order or message requesting the transfer of funds  (in 
the form of a claim on a third party) to the order of  the creditor. The order may relate either to a credit 
transfer or a debit transfer. 
Payment system:  it consists  of a defined  group  of institutions,  and  of a  set of instruments  and 
procedures, used to ensure the circulation of money within a geographical area, usually a country. - 6 -
Queuing:  a  risk  management  arrangement  whereby  transfer  orders  are  held  pending  by  the 
originator/deliverer or by the system until sufficient cover is  available in the originator's/deliverer's 
clearing account or under the net limits set against the payer; in some cases, cover may include unused 
credit lines or available collateral. 
Real-time transmission or processing:  the  transmission or processing  of funds  and/or  securities 
transfer instructions on an individual basis at the time they are initiated. 
Real-time gross-settlement systems (RTGS): (1) a funds transfer system (see para. 3); (2) in which 
payment orders  are  processed one  by  one in real-time;  and  (3)  which provides  for  the immediate 
settlement of all payments provided that there are enough funds  or overdraft facilities on the issuer 
account with the settlement agent. (see para. 50) 
Remote access to IFTS: (new definition). A credit institution has remote access to an IFfS if  its main 
office or one of its branches has direct access to an IFfS located in another country. 
Retail  payments, retail IFTS:  all  kinds  of payments  which  are  not  defined  as  large-ones.  (see 
para.lO) 
Settlement: completion of a payment or the discharge of an obligation between two or more parties. 
Frequently used to refer to the payment or discharge of interbank transactions  or a series of prior 
existing transactions. 
Settlement risk: a general term used to designate both credit and liquidity risks in a transfer system, 
i.e. the risk that a party will fail to meet one or more obligations to its counterparties or to a settlement 
agent or settlement institution. (see para. 47) 
Settlement agent:  the  institution initiating the  final  settlement of a clearing,  on behalf of all  the 
participants. 
Systemic risk: the risk that the  failure  of one participant in an interbank funds  transfer system or 
securities settlement system, as  in financial markets generally, to meet his required obligations will 
cause other participants or financial firms to be unable to meet their obligations when due. 
Zero-hour  clause:  (page  21  of  the  Main  Report).  Provision  in  the  bankruptcy  laws  which 
retroactively renders transactions of a closed institution ineffective after 0.00 a.m.  on the date it is 
ordered to be closed. Annex 3 
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